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Abstract
The idealized role of the jury is that of a neutral decision maker; however, the degree to which
individual verdict preferences represent jurors’ pre-existing beliefs about the legal system,
theories about issues important to the case at hand, and prior understanding of legal terms
remains inadequately explained. The purpose of the current study was to examine the direct and
indirect effects of pre-existing attitudes about the legal system upon verdict preferences.
Participants were 463 undergraduate students from the University of Texas at El Paso. Consistent
with the hypotheses, pre-existing attitudes about the legal system played a role in individual
verdicts, both directly and indirectly. These findings suggest that developing a better
understanding of the direct and indirect associations among prior beliefs, interpretations of the
evidence, and verdict preferences will aid legal professionals in ensuring that all defendants
receive a fair trial.
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Pre-existing beliefs about the legal system: The thirteenth juror?
The idealized role of the jury is that of a neutral decision maker. Jurors are expected to
enter the courtroom with no prior beliefs about the case at hand in order to make a fair and
impartial decision, maintaining throughout the trial the assumption that one is innocent until
proven guilty. But is this how the system really works? Are individual jurors’ verdicts simply
formed on the basis of the accumulation of objective evidence presented at trial? Or do these
individual verdict preferences represent jurors’ pre-existing beliefs about the system, theories
about issues important to the case at hand, and prior understanding of legal terms? While the
claim that prior beliefs play a significant role in constructing individual verdicts is consistent
with well-established theories and findings in social psychology and cognitive psychology (e.g.,
cognitive dissonance theory, heuristics), in recent years few empirical studies have examined the
direct and indirect associations among prior beliefs, interpretations of the evidence, and verdict
preferences.
The purpose of the current study was to examine this connection in a legal context.
Specifically, this study examined whether individual jurors’ interpretations of trial evidence and
subsequent verdict preferences were related to prior attitudes about the police and the legal
system. First, this paper discusses prior research regarding individual juror decision making,
followed by an examination of how cognitive heuristics and social psychological theory relate to
evidence interpretation. Next, the research concerning strength of evidence in a mock jury
context is examined. Finally, an original study is reported that examined the relations among
jurors’ pre-existing beliefs about the legal system, evidence interpretations, and subsequent
individual verdict preferences.
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Juror Decision Making
The overwhelming influence of jurors’ own predispositions upon verdict preferences has
long been noted. In fact, Frank (1950) labeled the effects of these extra-legal factors “the
thirteenth juror.” In the fifty-plus years since Kalven and Zeisel’s (1966) groundbreaking look at
juror decision-making, psychological research has continued to explore the impact of variables
that jurors bring into a trial such as personality characteristics (Boyll, 1991; Clark, Boccaccini,
Caillouet, & Chaplin, 2007; Davis, Bray, & Holt, 1977), prior attitudes about the police and the
legal system (Lecci & Myers, 2008; Meissner, Brigham, & Pfeifer, 2003; Thompson, Cowan,
Ellsworth, & Harrington, 1984), and biases concerning the legal system (Kassin & Wrightsman,
1983; Lecci & Myers, 2002).
It would be naïve to suggest that jurors are impartial, neutral listeners without
preconceived notions of guilt or innocence (Bonora & Krauss, 1979); in fact, prior research has
been able to predict individual jurors’ verdict preferences based on pre-existing attitudes towards
the legal system (Field, 1978; Thompson et al., 1984). Such findings have led to the development
of a number of standardized instruments designed to measure legally relevant attitudes such as
the Legal Attitudes Questionnaire (Boehm, 1968), the Revised Legal Attitudes Questionnaire
(Kravitz, Cutler, & Brock, 1993), the Juror Bias Scale (Kassin & Wrightsman, 1983), and the
Pretrial Juror Attitude Questionnaire (Lecci & Myers, 2008).
Still, while it is widely assumed by psychologists and lawyers alike that potential jurors’
attitudes are correlated with subsequent verdicts, the empirical evidence suggests that this
relation is a weak one at best (Lieberman & Sales, 2007; Saks, 1976; Suggs & Sales, 1978).
While relevant attitudes may be stronger predictors of jurors’ verdict preferences than are
demographic variables (Lieberman & Sales, 2007), attitude variables still generally account for a
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small amount of the variance and are affected by other factors such as the strength of evidence.
In addition, the predictive utility of attitude variables may be strongly dependent on the specific
case (Penrod, 1990). While the direct impact of attitudes upon verdict preferences may be weak,
attitudes may have indirect effects by influencing perceptions of the evidence (Hepburn, 1980).
Evidence Interpretation
The adversarial nature of the system requires jurors to sort through disputed and
contradictory pieces of evidence to make a decision as to what is “truth.” A number of studies
(e.g., Finkel & Handel, 1989; Hart, Evans, Wissler, Feehan, & Saks, 1997; Smith, 1993) have
found that, while the evidence presented in simulated studies remains constant, mock jurors still
reach disparate verdicts. One explanation for this disparity is that jurors are interpreting the
evidence in different ways. This leads one to speculate that pre-existing beliefs and attitudinal
factors may be affecting how mock jurors evaluate trial evidence.
Social psychologists have long reported that attitudes and beliefs influence people’s
interpretations of information (Allport, 1954; Festinger, 1957; Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Thompson
et al., 1984). More specifically, ambiguous information generally is interpreted in a way that
confirms expectations (Ross, Lepper, & Hubbard, 1975). In the jury context, therefore, it may be
relevant to gather information on potential jurors’ ideological positions concerning the legal
system.
Packer (1968) articulated the distinction between two ideological positions concerning
the criminal justice system: Due Process and Crime Control. Individuals orientated towards Due
Process tend to emphasize the fallibility of the criminal process. In other words, Due Process
values focus on the rights of the individual, the burden of proof, and the presumption of
innocence. In contrast, individuals oriented towards Crime Control emphasize the importance of
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stopping crime, viewing the control of criminal behavior as the most important function of the
criminal justice system. The Crime Control orientation is associated with a firm belief in the
effectiveness of criminal justice professionals (e.g., judges, police, prosecutors) in punishing the
guilty and freeing the innocent. In addition, the “presumption of guilt” rather than a belief in
“innocent until proven guilty” is key to crime control orientation. That is, if a person has been
arrested and charged, that is evidence that the person must be guilty of something.
A juror’s ideological orientation, be it Crime Control or Due Process, may affect both the
processing and recall of testimony (Butler & Moran, 2002; Casper, Benedict, & Kelly, 1988).
For example, Butler and Moran (2002) found that mock jurors’ attitudes towards capital
punishment influenced information processing such that participants indicating pro-capital
punishment attitudes placed more weight upon aggravating factors when making sentencing
recommendations than did individuals who opposed capital punishment.
Further, attitudes in the form of schema/knowledge structure shape the process of
testimony interpretation (Casper et al., 1989). For example, if testimony regarding a police stop
is unclear such that it is unknown whether the officer had reasonable cause to search the vehicle,
jurors predisposed to a crime control model may remember information regarding the officer
obtaining the motorist’s permission, or remember that the motorist behaved in such a way that
warranted suspicion. Similarly, Thompson et al. (1984) found that, when considering ambiguous
evidence, mock jurors endorsing pro-capital punishment attitudes interpreted such evidence in a
manner consistent with the prosecutor “script” for the case whereas mock jurors opposed to
capital punishment interpreted this information in a manner more favorable to the defense. Thus,
information is organized in terms of “scripts” about the legal system; details are omitted,
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distorted, or magnified to fill in gaps and draw inferences (Casper et al., 1989; Luginbuhl &
Middendorf, 1988; Thompson et al., 1984).
Basic theories and findings from cognitive and social psychology offer insight into how
jurors may interpret evidence. Cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957) suggests that
individuals are motivated to seek out attitude consistent information and to avoid dissonant
information. In cognitive psychology, this preference is known as the confirmation bias (Johnas,
Schulz-Hardt, Frey, & Thelen, 2001). The confirmation bias suggests that individuals tend to
recognize information or evidence that is consistent with a pre-existing belief or hypothesis more
readily than they recognize information that is inconsistent with the pre-existing belief (Kunda,
1987; Wason & Johnson-Laird, 1972). The confirmation bias serves as a cognitive heuristic or
mental shortcut that applies to the recollection of information as well as the processing of new
information. In a classic study, Snyder and Cantor (1979) presented participants with identical
information sheets about a woman named Jane. Every participant read the same list of traits
describing Jane. Later, when participants were asked to judge Jane’s suitability for a particular
position, those participants asked to assess her for a librarian position recalled more introverted
traits while those participants asked to assess her as a real estate agent remembered more
extroverted traits. Individuals tend to search their memories in a biased manner; in other words,
information that is consistent with the hypothesis presented is recalled more readily than is
inconsistent information.
Empirical research has illustrated that individuals not only seek out confirming evidence,
they also demonstrate a bias in the recall of information. When revisiting previously learned
information, participants tend to recall information that is consistent with prior beliefs or
hypotheses and disregard information that is inconsistent with these prior beliefs; in addition,
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greater attention is given to information that supports a desirable conclusion than is given to
refuting evidence (Kunda, 1987; Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979). Individuals tend to interpret
information in such a way to give greater weight to that information consistent with prior beliefs
(Nickerson, 1998). In short, the human tendency is to seek out, recall, and accept information
that is consistent with previous beliefs about the world.
Strength of Evidence
One of the most consistent findings in the mock jury paradigm is that the strength of the
evidence against the defendant is one of the strongest predictors of final verdict, typically
explaining the majority of the variation in verdict preferences (Devine, Clayton, Dunford,
Seying, & Pryce, 2001; Taylor & Hosch, 2004; Visher, 1987). In addition, strong evidence
generally overpowers individual differences in verdict preferences (Saks, 1976; Visher, 1987).
Saks (1976) suggested that the strength of evidence may be up to seven times more powerful at
predicting verdicts than were jurors’ attitudes and Visher (1987) found that evidence strength
accounted for nearly 35% of the variance in predicting verdicts while juror characteristics
accounted for only 2% of the variance.
Still, perceptions of strength of evidence also may be strongly tied to pre-existing legally
relevant attitudes (Suggs & Sales, 1978). Some authors have suggested an inverse relation
between the strength of the evidence and the impact of pre-existing attitudes on mock jurors’
verdicts such that strong evidence of either guilt or innocence is associated with a weak impact
of extra-legal factors (De La Fuente, De La Fuente, & Garcia, 2003). While this proposed
relation is logical, it is important to point out the perceived strength of the evidence may vary
across jurors, and this perception may be due to the evidence being filtered through a lens of pre-
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existing beliefs. In fact, it even has been suggested that jurors’ prior beliefs cannot be separated
from their evaluations of the strength of evidence (Burke, 2006).
This filter again relates to cognitive heuristics. In decision making, when the information
is consistent with a prior belief, less information is needed to accept that point of view than when
the evidence is inconsistent (Nickerson, 1998). In general, when recalling material,
disconfirming evidence would be judged as weak while confirming evidence is accepted at face
value without being scrutinized (Burke, 2006). In other words, events supporting a given
outcome are better remembered than those events that do not support the preferred outcome
(Liberman & Arndt, 2000). When applying this to a jury context, jurors may be more likely to
tune into evidence consistent with prior beliefs, recall this information, and accept this
information as valid. In contrast, evidence inconsistent with prior beliefs will be more likely to
be ignored, forgotten, and judged to be weak and irrelevant. Verdict is directly affected by
perceived strength of evidence (Devine et al., 2001); however, individual jurors’ personal
interpretations of the evidence may be driving their perceptions of the strength of evidence.
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Current Study
The purpose of the current study was to examine the direct and indirect effects of preexisting attitudes about the legal system upon verdict preferences. While it has been shown that
attitudes directly account for only a small proportion of the variance in verdict preferences
(Lieberman & Sales, 2007), the indirect impact of attitudes upon verdict preferences, as mediated
by the evaluation of the evidence, may better explain the influence of pretrial biases (Lecci,
Morris, & Myers, in preparation).
In addition, the current study examined the role of the perceived strength of the evidence
in individual verdict choices. Past research has shown that the strength of evidence is one of the
strongest predictors of verdict (Devine et al., 2001); however, no research has directly explored
how overall attitudes about the legal system influence jurors’ interpretations of the strength of
evidence.
Hypotheses
Based on the previous literature reviewed concerning mock jurors’ interpretations of
evidence and the findings in cognitive psychology concerning interpretation biases, four primary
hypotheses were examined:
Hypothesis 1: Mock jurors’ individual interpretations of the evidence presented will be
directly influenced by pre-existing attitudes about the legal system such that individuals
who endorse attitudes consistent with the Crime Control orientation will recall more
evidence in support of the prosecution while individuals who endorse attitudes consistent
with the Due Process orientation will recall more evidence in support of the defense.
Hypothesis 2: Mock jurors’ perceptions of the strength of the evidence presented against
the defendant will be influenced by their pre-existing attitudes about the legal system.
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Specifically, it is hypothesized that individuals who endorse attitudes consistent with the
Crime Control orientation will believe the evidence against the defendant to be stronger
than will individuals who endorse attitudes consistent with the Due Process orientation.
Hypothesis 3: Mock jurors’ individual verdicts will be influenced by their attitudes
towards the legal system and their perceptions of the strength of evidence. It is expected
that individuals who endorse attitudes consistent with the Crime Control orientation will
be more likely to vote to convict the defendant whereas individuals who endorse attitudes
consistent with the Due Process orientation will be more likely to vote to acquit the
defendant. Similarly, it is expected that individuals who perceive the case against the
defendant to be strong will be more likely to vote guilty while individuals who perceive
the case against the defendant to be weak will be more likely to vote to acquit.
Hypothesis 4: Mock jurors’ attitudes will indirectly influence verdict preferences through
the interpretations of trial evidence. It is hypothesized that the interpretation of evidence
and the perceived strength of evidence will mediate between individual mock jurors’
attitudes and verdicts such that verdict decisions will be influenced by the information
processing by the individual mock jurors. It is expected that individuals endorsing the
Crime Control orientation will interpret evidence in a manner more favorable to the
prosecution and will be more likely to provide a verdict of guilty; in contrast, individuals
endorsing the Due Process orientation will interpret evidence in a fashion more favorable
to the defense and will be more likely to provide a verdict of not guilty.
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Method
Participants
The final sample consisted of 463 undergraduate students from the University of Texas –
El Paso (UTEP). A power analysis was conducted to determine the number of participants
needed in this study to detect a small-to-medium effect size using a multiple regression model
(Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003). With α-level set at .05, a sample size of at least 415
participants was needed to detect a small to medium effect size (f² = .05) with power of .80.
Participants were recruited from Introduction to Psychology classes and received
compensation in the form of experimetrix credit. The basic demographics of the sample mirrored
those of UTEP and the surrounding region. In the final sample, 86.2% of the participants were
Hispanic, 59.8% were women, and the mean age of participants was 19.83 years.
Materials
Pre-Trial Juror Attitude Questionnaire. Information about participants’ attitudes about
the legal system was obtained through the administration of the Pretrial Juror Attitude
Questionnaire (PJAQ; Lecci & Myers, 2008). The PJAQ is a 29-item scale designed to measure
potential jurors’ attitudes toward the legal system. Lecci and Myers suggested six underlying
factors: conviction proneness (e.g., “Criminals should be caught and convicted by any means
necessary.”), system confidence (e.g., “When it is the suspect’s word against the police officer’s,
I believe the police.”), cynicism towards the defense (e.g., “Lawyers will do whatever it takes,
even lie, to win a case.”), social justice (e.g., “Rich individuals are almost never convicted of
their crimes.”), racial bias (e.g., “Minorities use the race issue only when they are guilty.”), and
innate criminality (e.g., “Once a criminal, always a criminal.”). Higher scores on the total
measure represent a conviction bias and attitudes consistent with the Crime Control orientation
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whereas lower scores on all scales represent attitudes consistent with the Due Process orientation
(See Appendix A). The PJAQ was chosen as an assessment of attitudes for the current study
because its predictive utility in estimating individual verdict preferences has been shown (Lecci
& Myers, 2008).
Voir Dire Questionnaire. The Voir Dire Questionnaire (See Appendix B) was used to
collect basic demographic information (e.g., age, gender, jury eligibility, and ethnicity) about
each participant. In addition, participants were asked about connections to the legal system (e.g.,
“Do you have a close friend or family member who is now or who has ever been law
enforcement?”); past experiences with the police (e.g., “Have you ever reported a crime to the
police?”); past experiences with attorneys (e.g., “Have you ever spoken with a lawyer?”); and
past experiences with the court system (e.g., “Have you ever been a witness in a criminal
case?”).
Trial Transcript. Participants were asked to read a transcript describing a burglary of
habitation trial (transcript available at http://admin.utep.edu/Default.aspx?tabid=49548). This
transcript has been used previously at the study institution and has been shown to produce nearly
equal frequencies of guilty verdicts and acquittals. In the transcript, a woman arrived home to
find that her residence had been burglarized and a specified amount of money and a gold watch
were missing. When questioned by the police, the woman provided a detailed description of a
vehicle she saw leaving her driveway. The defendant was found in his vehicle, which matched
the woman’s description, nearby the burglarized residence. When his vehicle was searched,
several watches and a large sum of money were found in addition to a toolbox containing tools
similar to those used in the burglary. The testimony and cross-examination of the victim, the
police officer, and the defendant were presented in the transcript.
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Verdict Form. The verdict form (See Appendix C) asked participants to find the
defendant either Guilty or Not-Guilty. In addition, participants who selected a verdict of guilty
were asked to provide a sentencing recommendation in accordance with Texas law.
Post-Verdict Questionnaire. The Post-Verdict Questionnaire (See Appendix D) was used
to assess participants’ interpretations of the evidence. Participants were asked to generate from
memory a list of the facts in evidence. This list was presented as a test of recall rather than of
recognition in accordance with the findings of Snyder and Cantor (1979). Individuals tend to
recall more attitude-consistent or confirming information than disconfirming information;
therefore using a recall task provided insight into participants’ interpretation of the trial. In
addition, this manner of presentation was intended to ensure that participants were not cued by
facts of evidence listed in a recognition task. Participants were asked to rank these facts in order
of most important to least important in forming their verdict preference (e.g., 1 being most
important, 2 being second most important, etc.). Participants then were asked to indicate whether
each fact generated appeared to support the prosecution or the defense or served as a general fact
of the case (e.g., time of arrest).
As a rating of perceived strength of evidence, participants were asked to consider the case
as a whole and to rate how strong they perceived the evidence against the defendant to be
overall. Participants rated the perceived SOE on 5-point Likert-type scale (1 = “Very Strong
Case against the Defendant” to 5 = “Very Weak Case against the Defendant”).
Procedure
Participants completed the entire study through online testing. Participation for this study
was completed in two separate sessions to avoid any priming effects. Specifically, completing
the assessment of pre-trial attitudes (PJAQ) prior to reading the trial transcript and rendering a
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verdict may prime specific attitudes while reading the trial materials and influence participants’
subsequent evidence evaluations and verdict ratings. Although past research on pre-trial juror
attitude questionnaires has demonstrated that completing a pretrial attitude measure has no effect
on the subsequent verdict choice (Morris & Lecci, 2005), the primary focus of the current study
involved individuals’ evidence evaluations. Thus, it was vital to the study that the attitudes
measures were conducted separately from evidence evaluations.
Session One. Participants for this portion of the study were recruited from the Psychology
Department’s Experimetrix program and received the link to the online questionnaire after
signing up for the study. In the first session, participants were invited to engage in a mass testing
measure for course credit. The measure included the pre-trial juror attitudes questionnaire
(PJAQ), the attitudes assessment used in the current study, along with measures to be used by
other researchers. The order of presentation for all measures in the mass testing session was
randomized. After completing the first session, participants were informed that their participation
in this study made them eligible to complete additional studies. Participants were reminded that
participation in any future studies was completely voluntary and choosing not to participate in
these future studies would not influence their credit for the current session.
All participants in the first session were asked to provide information making it possible
to connect responses in the mass testing to the optional future participation. This information was
used to create a unique experimental identification for each participant based on their responses
to three questions (e.g., “What is your favorite color?” “What was the make of your first car?”
“What are the last four digits of your student identification number?”). No identifying
information was used to match questionnaires and it was impossible to determine the identity of
any individual student based on the information gathered from these three questions.
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A total of 721 students signed up to participate in Session One. Complete data from 683
students were collected. Due to technical difficulties (e.g., logging-off during the experiment,
losing internet signal during the experiment) or extensive missing data (e.g., students logged on
to receive credit but only completed one or two items), data from 38 participants were removed
from the final sample for the mass testing database.
Session Two. Participants who completed Session One were eligible to complete Session
Two. After participating in the mass testing, participants were invited to participate in the second
session; however, all participants were informed that they were not obligated to participate in the
second session. Participants signed up for the Session Two through the Psychology Department’s
Experimetrix program and this session also was conducted with online testing. After signing up
for the study through Experimetrix, participants received the link for the second session.
Participants provided informed consent and were asked to provide responses to the same three
questions used in the mass testing to form the unique experimental identification. Next,
participants completed the Voir Dire Questionnaire and read the trial transcript. Once
participants finished reading the trial transcript, they were unable to return to earlier portions of
the study to review the details of the trial. After reading the transcript, participants were asked to
render an individual verdict. Finally, participants completed the post-verdict questionnaire and
were debriefed to the purposes of Session Two and informed of its connection to the mass testing
conducted in Session One.
A total of 524 students signed up for Session Two. Of these participants, 463 participants
were considered to have clean matches with Session One and were included in the final sample.
Matches were excluded from the final dataset if participants did not include responses to the
three questions to form the experimental identification (i.e., information on the matching
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variables was unavailable and data could not be accurately matched) or if the participant did not
complete the majority of the measures from either Session One or Session Two (i.e., student
logged on to the experiment to receive credit but only answered one or two questions).
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Results
Description of Final Sample
The final sample matched from Session One and Session Two included 463
undergraduate student participants. Along with basic demographic information, variables
considered relevant to a study set in a legal context were considered. As expected of a college
sample, the majority of participants reported no prior jury experience (97.8%) but most
participants were considered jury eligible under Texas law (90.0%). No significant differences in
results were observed when the participants who were not jury eligible were excluded from
analyses, thus data on the full sample are reported below. Overall, 64.2% of participants rendered
an individual verdict of guilty.
Factor Analysis of Pre-Trial Juror Attitude Questionnaire (PJAQ)
The 29-item Pre-Trial Juror Attitude Questionnaire (PJAQ; Lecci & Myers, 2008) was
used to assess participants’ pre-existing attitudes about the legal system. The six-factor solution
suggested by Lecci and Myers (2008) was assessed in the manner recommended by the
measure’s developers using a principal-components analysis with direct obliman rotation;
however, the pattern of loadings for the current sample was not consistent with the pattern of
loadings found by the original authors (See Table 1). Since this is a relatively new measure and
the underlying factor structure has not been fully established, a principal-component analysis
was conducted to investigate common themes and to determine the appropriate number of factors
for this sample. An initial un-rotated analysis suggested a one-factor solution (See Table 2).
Although this solution represented only 16.24% of the variance, the majority of the items (21
items) loaded highly on this one factor (factor loadings > 0.30). Therefore the single factor
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solution was chosen for the following analyses. The reliability of the overall PJAQ scale was
considered using Cronbach’s alpha and reliability was determined to be adequate (α = 0.79).
The composite score of the 29 PJAQ items was centered following the recommendations
of Cohen, Cohen, West, and Aiken (2003). Centering scores on the PJAQ also eased the
interpretation of analyses. Positive scores on the PJAQ can be seen as representing attitudes
consistent with the Crime Control orientation. Negative scores on the PJAQ can be seen as
representing attitudes consistent with the Due Process orientation.
Hypothesis 1
It was anticipated that mock jurors’ individual interpretations of the evidence would be
directly influenced by pre-existing attitudes about the legal system. Individuals who endorsed
attitudes consistent with the Crime Control orientation were expected to recall more evidence in
support of the prosecution while individuals who endorsed attitudes consistent with the Due
Process orientation were expected to recall more evidence in support of the defense.
To account for overall differences in recall, initial analyses were completed to examine
the total number of facts in evidence recalled by a participant as compared to a baseline number
of facts in the case. To establish baseline rates, independent coders blind to the purposes of this
study read the trial transcript and listed facts in evidence as being general facts, evidence in
support of the prosecution, and evidence in support of the defense. An inter-rater reliability
analysis using the Kappa statistic was performed to determine consistency among raters. Interrater reliability was found to be k = .59, p < .001, which is indicative of moderate to substantial
agreement (Landis & Koch, 1977).
Overall, the coders determined that the trial transcript used for this study included 45
facts in evidence with 21 of these facts in evidence being rated as general facts (e.g., time of
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arrest), 14 being rated as pro-prosecution (e.g., the defendant drove a car similar to the one
described leaving the scene), and 10 being rated as pro-defense (e.g., the defendant claimed he
was with his girlfriend at the time of the event). On average, participants recalled 5.18 total facts
of evidence (range 1 to 12), 3.53 pro-prosecution facts (range 0 to 10), 0.45 pro-defense facts
(range 0 to 7), and 1.20 general facts (range 0 to 8).
To determine the number of pro-prosecution and pro-defense facts recalled by each
participant, two additional coders (different coders than those coders who provided the baseline
evidence ratings for the trial) read participants’ listings of trial evidence and coded each fact in
evidence as “pro-prosecution,” “pro-defense,” or “general” based on the established baseline
evidence list. Again, an inter-rater reliability analysis using the Kappa statistic was performed to
determine consistency among raters. Inter-rater reliability was found to be k = .67, p < .001,
which is indicative of substantial agreement (Landis & Koch, 1977).
The total number of pro-prosecution or pro-defense facts recalled was then converted into
a proportion of the total number of facts recalled for each participant. For example, a participant
who recalled 10 total facts in evidence and indicated that eight of these facts were seen as proprosecution would receive a pro-prosecution score of 0.80 (See Table 3 for the descriptive
statistics of the evidence variables).
To ascertain the degree of association between pre-existing attitudes and the number and
type of evidence recalled, a series of bivariate Pearson correlations were conducted. To control
for alpha-inflation, the Bonferroni correction was used in determining the statistical significance
of the bivariate correlations. The PJAQ-score was correlated with three separate evidence
variables: (1) the total number of facts in evidence recalled, including general facts, pro-
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prosecution evidence, and pro-defense evidence, (2) the proportion of pro-prosecution evidence
recalled, and (3) the proportion of pro-defense evidence recalled.
Total Evidence Recalled. The relation between the total number of facts in evidence
recalled and the overall PJAQ score was analyzed using a one-tailed bivariate correlation. As
hypothesized, the association was statistically significant, r = - 0.12, p = 0.01. The negative
direction indicates that higher scores on the PJAQ, representing attitudes consistent with the
Crime Control orientation, were associated with recalling fewer facts in evidence overall.
Proportion of Pro-Prosecution Evidence Recalled. The relation between the proportion
of pro-prosecution evidence recalled and the overall PJAQ score was analyzed using a one-tailed
bivariate correlation. Again, consistent with hypothesis, this association was statistically
significant, r = 0.10, p = 0.01. Higher scores on the PJAQ, representing attitudes consistent with
the Crime Control orientation, were associated with recalling a higher proportion of proprosecution evidence.
Proportion of Pro-Defense Evidence Recalled. The relation between the proportion of
pro-defense evidence recalled and the overall PJAQ score was analyzed using a one-tailed
bivariate correlation. Results were contrary to the hypothesis, r = -0.07, p = 0.07; there was no
statistically significant association between the proportion of pro-defense evidence recalled and
pre-existing attitudes toward the legal system as measured by the PJAQ.
Summary of Hypothesis 1. Overall, there was partial support for Hypothesis 1. Pre-trial
attitudes, as assessed by the PJAQ, were significant predictors of the total number of trial facts
recalled and the proportion of pro-prosecution evidence recalled. Attitudes consistent with the
Crime Control orientation (i.e., higher scores on the PJAQ) were associated with fewer facts
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recalled overall, but with recalling a greater proportion of pro-prosecution evidence. Pre-existing
attitudes were not significantly related to the proportion of pro-defense evidence recalled.
Hypothesis 2
The second hypothesis predicted that mock jurors’ perceptions of the strength of the
evidence presented against the defendant would be influenced by their pre-existing attitudes
about the legal system. Specifically, it was hypothesized that individuals who endorsed attitudes
consistent with the Crime Control orientation (i.e., higher scores on the PJAQ) would believe the
evidence against the defendant to be stronger than would individuals who endorsed attitudes
consistent with the Due Process orientation (i.e., lower scores on the PJAQ).
To examine the influence of attitudes towards the legal system upon perceptions of the
strength of evidence, a one-tailed Pearson bivariate correlation analysis was performed. First,
perceived strength of evidence, as measured by a 5-point Likert-type scale, was reverse coded for
clarification. This was done so that higher scores on the Perceived Strength of Evidence (PSOE)
variable represented perceptions that the case against the defendant was a strong one.
Perceived strength of evidence was correlated with the total scale score on the PJAQ. As
hypothesized, mock jurors’ individual perceptions of the strength of evidence were significantly
related to pre-existing attitudes about the legal system as measured by the PJAQ, r = 0.13, p <
0.01. Pre-existing attitudes were correlated with overall score on the PJAQ such that attitudes
consistent with the Crime Control orientation (i.e., higher scores on the PJAQ) were associated
with being more likely to perceive the case against the defendant to be strong.
Hypothesis 3
Hypothesis 3 predicted that mock jurors’ individual verdicts would be influenced by their
attitudes towards the legal system and their perceptions of the strength of evidence. It was
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expected that individuals who endorsed attitudes consistent with the Crime Control orientation
would be more likely to vote to convict the defendant whereas individuals who endorsed
attitudes consistent with the Due Process orientation would be more likely to vote to acquit the
defendant. Similarly, it was expected that individuals who perceived the case against the
defendant to be strong would be more likely to vote to convict while individuals who perceive
the case against the defendant to be weak would be more likely to vote to acquit.
A binary logistic regression analysis was conducted to examine mock jurors’ individual
verdict choices (i.e., Guilty vs. Not Guilty) as they related to attitudes towards the legal system
and perceived strength of evidence. Consistent with the hypothesis, the overall model was
significant, Nagelkerke R2 = 0.51, R2 = 0.45, χ2 (2) = 198.03, p < 0.001. Pre-existing attitudes
were not a significant predictor of verdict, although the probability of a Type I error was very
close to that of the traditional criterion of significance, B = 0.02, Wald (1) = 3.43, p = 0.06. The
trend was such that attitudes consistent with the Crime Control orientation (i.e., higher scores on
the PJAQ) were marginally associated with the logged odds of rendering a verdict of guilty.
Perceived strength of evidence emerged as a significant predictor of verdict preference, B = 1.95,
Wald (1) = 94.12, p < 0.001, such that participants who perceived the case against the defendant
as strong were more likely to render a verdict of Guilty than were participants who perceived the
case against the defendant to be weak.
The interaction term between pre-existing attitudes and perceptions of the strength of
evidence was added into the model in a second step. Again, the overall model was significant
Nagelkerke R2 = 0.51, R2 = 0.45, χ2 (2) = 198.10, p < 0.001. Again, perceived strength of
evidence emerged as a significant predictor of verdict preference, B = 1.95, Wald (1) = 93.98, p
< 0.001, such that participants who perceived the case against the defendant as strong were more
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likely to render a verdict of Guilty than were participants who perceived the case against the
defendant to be weak. Pre-existing attitudes about the legal system, B = 0.01, Wald (1) = 0.10, p
= 0.92, and the interaction term, B = 0.01, Wald (1) = 0.07, p = 0.79 were not significant
predictors of verdict.
Hypothesis 4
Hypothesis 4 predicted a path model to assess the indirect influence of attitudes upon
verdict. It was anticipated that mock jurors’ attitudes would indirectly influence verdict
preferences through the interpretations of trial evidence, defined by the type of evidence recalled
and the perceived strength of evidence. It was hypothesized that the interpretation of evidence
would mediate between individual juror attitudes and verdicts such that verdict decisions would
be influenced by the information processing by the individual mock jurors.
Mediation Model. A path model was constructed to test for mediation following the
recommendations of Baron and Kenny (1986; see Figure 1 for a representation of the conceptual
model):
First, using binary logistic regression, verdict was regressed upon the proportion of prodefense evidence recalled, the proportion of pro-prosecution evidence recalled, perceived
strength of evidence, and the overall PJAQ score. All regression coefficients in the regression
models were standardized (MacKinnon, 1994). The regression coefficients obtained in the binary
logistic regression analysis were standardized according to the procedure described by Menard
(2002). As hypothesized, the overall model was significant, Nagelkerke R2 = 0.61, R2 = 0.54, χ2
(4) = 240.24, p < 0.001. All predictor variables were significant predictors. Proportion of proprosecution evidence recalled significantly predicted verdict, B = 0.91, β = 0.08, Wald (1) = 4.29,
p = 0.04, such that recalling a larger proportion of pro-prosecution evidence was associated with

22

the logged odds of rendering an individual verdict of guilty. In addition, proportion of prodefense evidence recalled significantly predicted verdict, B = -4.30, β = -0.28, Wald (1) = 11.26,
p = 0.001, such that recalling a larger proportion of pro-defense evidence was associated with the
logged odds of rendering an individual verdict of not-guilty. Perceived strength of evidence
significantly predicted verdict, B = 1.92, β = 0.48, Wald (1) = 76.12, p < 0.001, such that
perceiving the case against the defendant to be strong was associated with the logged odds of
rendering a verdict of guilty. Finally, pre-existing attitudes were a significant predictor of
verdict, B = 0.03, β = 0.10, Wald (1) = 5.58, p = 0.02, such that endorsing higher attitudes
consistent with the Crime Control orientation (i.e., higher scores on the PJAQ) was associated
with the logged odds of rendering a verdict of guilty. The total effect of attitudes upon verdict
was 0.15; the direct effect (0.10) accounted for 67% of the total effect and the sum of the indirect
effects (0.05) accounted for the remaining 33% of the total effect.
In the next step of the mediation model, using a multiple regression analysis, perceived
strength of evidence was regressed upon proportion of pro-defense evidence recalled, proportion
of pro-prosecution evidence recalled, and pre-existing attitudes. Consistent with the hypothesis,
the overall model was significant, R2 = 0.16, F (3, 403) = 24.77, p < 0.001. The proportion of
pro-prosecution evidence recalled, β = 0.12, p = 0.04, and the proportion of pro-defense evidence
recalled, β = -0.30, p < 0.001, were both significant predictors of perceived strength of evidence,
indicating that recalling a greater proportion of pro-prosecution evidence was associated with
perceiving the case against the defendant to be strong and recalling a greater proportion of prodefense evidence was associated with perceiving the case against the defendant to be weak. Preexisting attitudes about the legal system, as measured by the PJAQ, were not a significant
predictor of PSOE, β = 0.09, p = 0.06. The probability of a Type I error was very close to the
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traditional criterion of significance and there was an observed trend such that participants who
endorsed attitudes consistent with the Crime Control orientation (i.e., higher scores on the PJAQ)
were marginally more likely to perceive the case against the defendant to be strong.
Finally, for the last step in the mediation model, two multiple regression analyses were
conducted. First, the proportion of pro-prosecution evidence recalled was regressed upon preexisting attitudes about the legal system. The overall model examining the proportion of proprosecution evidence recalled was significant, R2 = 0.01, F (1, 418) = 4.42, p = 0.04, and
attitudes consistent with the Crime Control orientation (i.e., higher scores on the PJAQ) were
associated with recalling more pro-prosecution evidence, β = 0.10, p < 0.04. The proportion of
pro-defense evidence recalled also was regressed upon pre-existing attitudes about the legal
system. The model assessing the amount of pro-defense evidence recalled was not significant, R2
= 0.005, F (1, 418) = 2.31, p = 0.13.
Interpretation of Mediation Model. The mediation model indicated that pre-existing
attitudes about the legal system provide some direct and indirect influence upon individual
verdict (See Figure 2). Pre-existing attitudes about the legal system significantly predicted
verdict in the full model, providing evidence of a direct path between pre-existing attitudes and
verdict. Attitudes also significantly predicted evaluations of evidence, conceptualized by
evidence recalled and perceptions of the strength of evidence (marginally significant). In turn, all
three assessments of mock jurors’ evaluations of evidence (proportion of pro-prosecution
evidence recalled, proportion of pro-defense evidence recalled, and perceptions of strength of
evidence) significantly predicted verdict. These paths provides some evidence of an indirect
association between attitudes and verdict, partially mediated by evaluations of evidence.

24

In addition, the type of evidence recalled was shown to be related to perceptions of
strength of evidence. The amount of pro-defense evidence recalled was significantly related to
perceiving the case against the defendant to be weaker, while the amount of pro-prosecution
evidence recalled was significantly associated with perceiving the case against the defendant to
be stronger.
Thus, results provide evidence that evaluations of trial information are influenced by preexisting attitudes. Further, evaluations of trial evidence influence individual verdict choices.
These findings indicate that attitudes may influence individual verdicts in two ways. First,
consistent with prior research, there is a direct association between pre-existing attitudes and
verdict. In addition, results suggest that, while all jurors may encounter the same case facts and
evidence during the trial, they may interpret this evidence in disparate ways, based in part on
their pre-existing attitudes about the legal system. These interpretations of the trial evidence may
influence subsequent individual verdicts.
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Discussion
The purpose of the current study was to investigate the direct and indirect impact of preexisting attitudes about the legal system upon mock juror decision making. Such research has
both important theoretical and practical implications and could enhance our understanding of the
jury decision making process. The following sections discuss results concerning the direct and
indirect associations among pre-existing attitudes, evidence evaluations, and ultimate individual
verdict preferences.
Pre-existing Attitudes about the Legal System
Researchers in jury decision making have long recognized that jurors are not impartial,
blank slates with no pre-existing attitudes or experiences with the legal system (Bonora &
Krauss, 1979; Thompson et al., 1984). The field of “scientific jury selection” was developed
based primarily upon this premise (Lecci, Morris, & Snowden, 2004; Shestowsky & Strier,
1999) resulting in the creation of several assessments of pre-trial attitudes (Boehm, 1968; Kassin
& Wrightsman, 1983; Kravitz, Cutler, & Brock, 1993; Lecci & Myers, 2008).
While these developments imply that attitudes must account for some amount of the
variance in verdict selection, only a weak direct impact of attitudes has been observed (Hepburn,
1980; Penrod, 1990). Still, there has been a consistent push to incorporate attitudinal
questionnaires into the jury voir dire (Lecci & Myers, 2008; Moran, Cutler, & Loftus, 1990;
Narby, Cutler, & Moran, 1993). The current study sought to contribute to the literature by using
classic attitude theory to examine the direct and indirect impact of attitudes on jury decision
making.
Consistent with previous research, the current study observed a weak, yet significant,
direct impact of attitudes upon individual verdict. Understanding the impact of potential jurors’
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pre-trial attitudes upon final verdict decisions has received heightened attention in recent years.
The use of attitudes assessments in voir dire is intended to ensure that individuals possessing
biases are not included on the jury. Often times, voir dire sessions are brief, allowing attorneys
only a small chance to assess a roomful of potential jurors. Studies have indicated that as much
as two-thirds of the jury panel may possess attitudes or biases against the defendant (Covinton,
1985; Hans & Jehle, 2003). Finding a way to identify biased individuals quickly may be vital to
ensuring a fair trial. Using standardized attitudes assessments may provide attorneys with
valuable tools for identifying potential biases (Lecci & Myers, 2008), therefore it is important to
study the predictive utility of these measures and create a general understanding of the types of
attitudes that may have a biasing impact on jurors’ verdicts.
Evaluations of Evidence
A primary purpose of the current study was to consider the impact of pre-existing
attitudes upon evaluations of trial evidence. Decades of research in social psychology indicate
that attitudes and beliefs can influence how people interpret information about the world around
them (Allport, 1954; Festinger, 1957; Nisbett & Ross, 1980). These findings would suggest that
pre-existing attitudes should have some influence on jurors’ interpretations of trial evidence.
The results of the current study indicate that attitudes may have an impact upon the
amount and type of evidence that mock jurors recalled. Consistent with prior theories on juror
decision making such as the Story Model (Pennington & Hastie, 1981), individual mock jurors
appeared to create a consistent picture of the trial evidence based on their pre-conceived notions
about the legal system. Perceptions of the strength of evidence of the case against the defendant
seemed to be particularly important in developing an overall “story” based on the evidence.
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Consistently, research in the mock jury paradigm has found strength of evidence to be
one of the strongest predictors of final verdict (Devine et al., 2001). The current study
contributes to this body of research by examining mock jurors’ perceptions of the strength of
evidence. Rather than manipulating the strength of evidence by varying the trial evidence
presented (e.g., Skolnick & Shaw, 2001), all participants in this study read identical trial stimuli
and rated the strength of evidence based on their own perceptions of the trial. Variations in
ratings indicate that strength of evidence cannot be considered a definitive in any case or trial
stimulus; in other words, the strength of evidence of any case is open to interpretation.
The current study found that perceptions of the strength of evidence were significantly
related to pre-existing attitudes about the legal system. Attitudes related to the Crime Control
orientation predicted perceptions of the overall strength of the evidence against the defendant.
This finding suggests that individuals who felt more confident in the legal system’s ability to
control crime by accurately identifying and apprehending criminals were more likely to perceive
the overall case against the defendant to be strong. Strong attitudes of system confidence as an
indication of a Crime Control orientation may provide a specific context for interpreting the
strength of evidence against the defendant. For example, if one believes that the legal system is
effective in accurately identifying criminals, the fact that a defendant is even on trial could be
interpreted as strong evidence of guilt. Thus, pre-existing attitudes may form a filter or schema
for which the trial evidence is processed (Butler & Moran, 2002).
Taken together, the results suggest that individuals do differ in how they perceive and
evaluate trial evidence, in part due to pre-existing attitudes about the legal system. More research
is necessary to uncover factors that do influence how individuals evaluate the overall evidence
presented in a trial. Pre-existing attitudes about the legal system were associated with evaluations
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of the perceived strength of evidence. Thus, attitudes may have an indirect role in individual
verdict decisions. Consistent with past research, attitudes have only a weak direct impact upon
verdict in the current study; however there is also indication of an indirect influence upon verdict
decision through evaluation of the evidence, specifically through perceptions of the strength of
the evidence.
Future Directions
The current study used the Pre-trial Juror Attitude Questionnaire (PJAQ; Lecci & Myers,
2008) to assess pre-existing attitudes about the legal system. While this measure has been shown
to have some predictive utility in studying individual verdicts (Lecci & Myers, 2008), it is just
one means for understanding the attitudes and experiences that potential jurors bring into the
courtroom. Future studies would benefit from using additional measures of pre-existing attitudes.
Similarly, a more in-depth assessment of prior experiences may provide some additional insight
into jurors’ perceptions of the evidence.
One key variable in the current study appears to be perceptions of the strength of the
evidence. Perceived strength of evidence is influenced to some degree by pre-existing attitudes
and by the type of evidence recalled. The jury decision making literature has long recognized the
importance of strength of evidence in accounting for individuals’ final verdict preferences
(Devine et al. 2001; Visher, 1987); still, little is known about how perceptions of the strength of
evidence are created by individual jurors. Jury decision making models such as the Story Model
(Pennington & Hastie, 1981) may be updated and expanded upon to consider these individual
perceptions of evidence and their place in the overall “story” constructed by each juror.
Finally, a noted limitation of much of the research in jury decision making is that it
examines individual juror decision making rather than group jury decision making. Studying
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group decision making, especially in the context of the jury, is not without its challenges.
However, this step is necessary to create a cohesive picture of verdict formation in the real
world. The current study indicates that individuals’ unique perceptions of the evidence may drive
their personal verdict choices. But what happens when individuals with different perceptions of
the evidence meet together to form one group decision? This is still unknown.
Conclusion
Theories in both social and cognitive psychology indicate that beliefs play a significant
role in constructing individual interpretations of the surrounding world. Thus it is not surprising
that legal professionals have long hypothesized that the attitudes jurors already possess when
they enter the courtroom may color their interpretations of trial evidence. The current study
found support for this idea, showing that pre-existing attitudes about the legal system were
directly associated with mock jurors’ individual verdict preferences. Further, pre-existing
attitudes were associated with evaluations of trial evidence (e.g., the type of information recalled
and perceptions of the strength of evidence), which in turn influenced verdict selection. These
findings suggest that developing a better understanding of the direct and indirect associations
among prior beliefs, interpretations of the evidence, and verdict preferences will aid legal
professionals in ensuring that all defendants receive a fair trial.
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Table 1.
Summary of Exploratory Factor Analysis Results for the Pre-Trial Juror Attitude Questionnaire
Factor Loadings
Item

Factor
1

Factor
2

Factor
3

Factor
4

Factor
5

Factor
6

If a suspect runs from the police then he probably
committed the crime. (CON)

.239

-.093

.588

.054

.168

-.017

A defendant should be found guilty if 11 out of 12
jurors vote guilty. (CP)

.391

.014

.173

.125

-.020

.024

Too often jurors hesitate to convict someone who is
guilty out of pure sympathy. (CP)

.165

.117

-.194

.598

.145

-.050

In most cases, where the accused presents a strong
defense, it is only because of a good lawyer. (CYN)

.340

.047

-.181

.182

.169

.313

Out of every 100 people brought to trial, at least 75
are guilty of the crime with which they are charged.
(CON)

.002

-.0541

.086

.579

-.152

.083

For serious crimes like murder, a defendant should
be found guilty so long as there is a 90% change
that he committed the crime. (CP)

.250

.331

.421

-.128

-.174

.094

Defense lawyers don’t really care about guilt or
innocence, they are just in business to make money.
(CYN)

.033

.505

.007

.252

.147

.158

Generally, the police make an arrest only when they
are sure about who committed the crime. (CON)

.507

-.125

-.011

-.075

-.0998

.108

Many accident claims filed against insurance
companies are phony. (CYN)

.201

.195

.050

.307

-.059

.071

The defendant is often a victim of his own bad
reputation (reverse coded). (RB)

.008

-.006

-.010

-.496

-.193

-.017

Extenuating circumstances should not be
considered; if a person commits a crime, then that
person should be punished. (CP)

-.085

.049

.489

.191

-.154

.159

If the defendant committed a victimless crime like
gambling or possession of marijuana, he should
never be convicted (reverse coded). (SJ)

-.065

-.574

.320

.258

.003

-.066

.085

.527

.142

.307

-.040

-.146

-.238

.439

.005

.282

.301

.020

.583

-.070

.058

.164

.096

-.026

Defense lawyers are too willing to defend
individuals they know are guilty. (CYN)
Police routinely lie to protect other police officers.
(CYN)
Once a criminal, always a criminal. (INNCR)
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Lawyers will do whatever it takes, even lie, to win a
case. (CYN)

-.198

.467

.288

.099

.150

.102

Criminals should be caught and convicted by any
means necessary. (CP)

.038

.194

.575

.095

-.230

.060

A prior record of conviction is the best indicator of
a person’s guilt in the present case. (CON; INNCR)

.680

.150

.0765

-.039

-.074

.011

Rich individuals are almost never convicted of their
crimes. (SJ)

-.064

.080

.162

.010

.755

.039

.661

.189

.046

-.035

-.053

-.017

Minorities use the race issue only when they are
guilty. (RB)

-.024

-.155

.200

.230

.072

.524

When it is the suspect’s word against the police
officer’s, I believe the police. (CON)

.498

-.339

.114

.089

.018

.093

Men are more likely to be guilty of crimes than are
women. (INNCR)

.068

.094

-.115

-.196

.097

.624

The large number of African Americans currently in
prison is an example of the innate criminality of that
group. (RB)

-.016

.098

.243

-.156

-.054

.599

A black man on trial with a predominantly white
jury will always be found guilty. (SJ)

.165

.386

-.012

-.105

.301

.116

Minority suspects are likely to be guilty, more often
than not. (RB)

.014

-.085

-.089

.176

-.0883

.701

If a witness refuses to take a lie detector test, it is
because he/she is hiding something. (CON)

.179

-.043

.642

-.189

.172

-.001

Defendants who change their story are almost
always guilty. (CYN)

.146

-.115

.609

-.054

.259

.006

-.054

-.007

-.005

.048

.768

-.0314

1.52

1.31

1.28

1.18

5.23

4.50

4.04

4.01

If a defendant is a member of a gang, he/she is
definitely guilty of the crime. (INNCR)

Famous people are often considered to be above the
law. (SJ)
Eigenvalues
Percent of variance

4.93
16.98

2.57
8.86

Six-Factor Solution analyzed by principal components analysis with direct obliman rotation.
Salient loadings greater than 0.30 are bold.
Note: Subscales proposed by Lecci and Myers (2008) are noted after each item. CON = system confidence; CP =
conviction proneness; CYN = cynicism toward the defense; RB = racial bias; SJ = social justice; = INNCR = innate
criminality.
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Table 2.
Summary of Exploratory Factor Analysis Unrotated One-Factor Solution
Item

Factor

If a suspect runs from the police then he probably committed the crime. (CON)

.580

A defendant should be found guilty if 11 out of 12 jurors vote guilty. (CP)

.451

Too often jurors hesitate to convict someone who is guilty out of pure sympathy. (CP)

.306

In most cases, where the accused presents a strong defense, it is only because of a good lawyer.
(CYN)

.441

Out of every 100 people brought to trial, at least 75 are guilty of the crime with which they are
charged. (CON)

.307

For serious crimes like murder, a defendant should be found guilty so long as there is a 90%
change that he committed the crime. (CP)

.522

Defense lawyers don’t really care about guilt or innocence, they are just in business to make
money. (CYN)

.462

Generally, the police make an arrest only when they are sure about who committed the crime.
(CON)

.293

Many accident claims filed against insurance companies are phony. (CYN)

.406

The defendant is often a victim of his own bad reputation (reverse coded). (RB)

-.290

Extenuating circumstances should not be considered; if a person commits a crime, then that person
should be punished. (CP)

.424

If the defendant committed a victimless crime like gambling or possession of marijuana, he should
never be convicted (reverse coded). (SJ)

.034

Defense lawyers are too willing to defend individuals they know are guilty. (CYN)

.389

Police routinely lie to protect other police officers. (CYN)

.231

Once a criminal, always a criminal. (INNCR)

.494

Lawyers will do whatever it takes, even lie, to win a case. (CYN)

.376

Criminals should be caught and convicted by any means necessary. (CP)

.496

A prior record of conviction is the best indicator of a person’s guilt in the present case. (CON;
INNCR)

.548

Rich individuals are almost never convicted of their crimes. (SJ)

.329

If a defendant is a member of a gang, he/she is definitely guilty of the crime. (INNCR)

.510

Minorities use the race issue only when they are guilty. (RB)

.492
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When it is the suspect’s word against the police officer’s, I believe the police. (CON)

.388

Men are more likely to be guilty of crimes than are women. (INNCR)

.310

The large number of African Americans currently in prison is an example of the innate criminality
of that group. (RB)

.442

A black man on trial with a predominantly white jury will always be found guilty. (SJ)

.351

Minority suspects are likely to be guilty, more often than not. (RB)

.387

If a witness refuses to take a lie detector test, it is because he/she is hiding something. (CON)

.494

Defendants who change their story are almost always guilty. (CYN)

.512

Famous people are often considered to be above the law. (SJ)

.182

Eigenvalues

4.93

Percent of variance

16.98

Unrotated factor solution analyzed with principal components analysis.
Salient loadings greater than 0.30 are bold.
Note: Subscales proposed by Lecci and Myers (2008) are noted after each item. CON = system confidence; CP =
conviction proneness; CYN = cynicism toward the defense; RB = racial bias; SJ = social justice; = INNCR = innate
criminality.
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Table 3.
Descriptive Statistics for Evidence Evaluation Variables
Frequency Distribution of Number of Facts Recalled
Number of Facts

Pro-Prosecution

Pro-Defense

General Facts

Total Facts

0

119

391

275

42

1

12

25

69

6

2

25

13

38

19

3

89

16

30

72

4

80

9

23

70

5

60

7

11

80

6

40

2

9

75

7

23

1

7

49

8

13

-

2

30

9

2

-

-

7

10

1

-

-

7

11

-

-

-

4

12

-

-

-

3

3.53 (2.25)

0.45 (1.17)

1.19 (1.78)

5.18 (2.03)

Mean (sd)
N = 464

Descriptive Statistics for Evidence Evaluation Variables
Proportion Pro-Prosecution
Evidence Recalled

Proportion Pro-Defense
Evidence Recalled

Proportion General Evidence
Recalled

Mean

0.69

0.10

0.21

Std Deviation

0.38

0.26

0.30

Skewness

-0.85

2.74

1.40

Kurtosis

-0.85

6.20

0.89
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Proportion
Pro-Prosecution
Evidence Recalled

Proportion
Pro-Defense
Evidence
Recalled

Perceived Strength
of Evidence

Individual
Verdict

Pre-Trial Juror Attitude
Questionnaire Scores

Figure 1. Conceptual path-analytic model: Influence of pre-existing attitudes, evidence interpretation,
and perceived strength of evidence upon individual juror verdicts.
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Proportion ProProsecution
Evidence Recalled

Proportion ProDefense Evidence
Recalled

r = -0.61

0.12

-.29

Perceived Strength
of Evidence
0.10

0.08

-0.07 (ns)

0.48

0.09

Pre-Trial Juror Attitude
Questionnaire Scores

-0.28

Individual
Verdict
0.10

Note: Values represent standardized regression coefficients unless otherwise noted.
Figure 2. Observed path-analytic model: Influence of pre-existing attitudes, evidence interpretation,
and perceived strength of evidence upon individual juror verdicts.
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Appendix A
Pre-Trial Juror Attitude Questionnaire: Please answer the questions below based on the given
scale.
1
Strongly
Disagree

2
Disagree

3
Neither Agree
nor Disagree

4
Agree

5
Strongly Agree

If a suspect runs from the police, then he probably committed the crime.
A defendant should be found guilty if 11 out of 12 jurors vote guilty.
Too often jurors hesitate to convict someone who is guilty out of pure sympathy.
In most cases where the accused presents a strong defense, it is only because of a
good lawyer.
Out of every 100 people brought to trial, at least 75 are guilty of the crime with
which they are charged.
For serious crimes like murder, a defendant should be found guilty so long as
there is a 90% chance that he committed the crime.
Defense lawyers don’t really care about guilt or innocence, they are just in
business to make money.
Generally, the police make an arrest only when they are sure about who
committed the crime.
Many accident claims filed against insurance companies are phony.
The defendant is often a victim of his own bad reputation.
Extenuating circumstances should not be considered; if a person commits a crime,
then that person should be punished.
If the defendant committed a victimless crime like gambling or possession of
marijuana, he should never be convicted.
Defense lawyers are too willing to defend individuals they know are guilty.
Police routinely lie to protect other police officers.
Once a criminal, always a criminal.
Lawyers will do whatever it takes, even lie, to win a case.
Criminals should be caught and convicted by “any means necessary.”
A prior record of conviction is the best indicator of a person’s guilt in the present
case.
Rich individuals are almost never convicted of their crimes.
If a defendant is a member of a gang, he/she is definitely guilty of the crime.
Minorities use the “race issue” only when they are guilty.
When it is the suspect’s word against the police officer’s, I believe the police.
Men are more likely to be guilty of crimes than are women.
The large number of African Americans currently in prison is an example of the
innate criminality of that group.
A black man on trial with a predominantly white jury will always be found guilty.
Minority suspects are likely to be guilty, more often then not.
If a witness refuses to take a lie detector test, it is because he/she is hiding
something.
Defendants who change their story are almost always guilty.
Famous people are often considered to be “above the law.”
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Appendix B
VOIR DIRE QUESTIONNAIRE
Demographic Information:
Age:

Gender:

Ethnicity:

Years Lived in El Paso:
Licensed Driver: Yes

No

Registered Voter: Yes

No

Marital Status: Married

Never Married

Divorced

Widowed

If Married: Years Married
If You Have Children: Number of Children:
Your Occupation and Employer:
Name of Last School or College Attended, Grade Completed, or Degree Received:

What is (was) the principal profession or vocation of your parents?
Father:

Mother:

Your religious preference (if any):

Experiences with the Legal System:
In this section, you will be asked some general questions about your personal experiences with
the legal system. Please answer these questions honestly. Again, please remember that these
answers are completely anonymous.
Have you served on a jury before? Yes
If yes, how many times?
Was it Civil
; Criminal
Was a verdict rendered? Yes

No
; Grand Jury

?

No

Are you now or have you ever been a law enforcement officer?
If yes, state what type and when:
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Yes

No

Do you have a close friend or relative who is now or ever has been a law enforcement officer?
Yes
No
If yes, state the nature of the relationship, type of law enforcement officer, and when the
individual was (is) a law enforcement officer:
Have you ever been a victim of a crime? Yes
No
If yes, state the nature of the crime and when it occurred:
Has any close friend or relative ever been the victim of a crime? Yes
If yes, state the nature of the crime and when it occurred:
Have you ever been a witness in a criminal case? Yes
If yes, state the type of case and when it occurred:

No

No

Do you have a close friend or relative who is now or ever has been an attorney?
Yes
No
If yes, state the nature of the relationship, type of attorney, and when the individual was
(is) practicing law:
Overall, how do you feel about police officers?
-3
Very
Negative

-2

-1

0
Neutral

Have you ever spoken with a police officer? Yes
If yes, how many times?

1

2

No

Once or twice
A few times
Several times
Many times
If yes, in what contexts? (check all that apply)
Speeding ticket / traffic accident
Answering questions about something I had seen
Answering questions about something I may have done
Answering questions about something that happened to me
Talking about general issues or concerns such as safety
In a social context
Other (please explain)
Have you ever reported a crime to the police? Yes
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No

3
Very
Positive

Overall, how do you feel about lawyers?
-3
Very
Negative

-2

-1

Have you ever spoken with a lawyer? Yes
If yes, how many times?

0
Neutral

1

2

3
Very
Positive

No

Once or twice
A few times
Several times
Many times
If yes, in what contexts? (check all that apply)
Answering questions about something I had seen
Getting advice on a civil matter, such as a divorce, will, or lawsuit
Getting advice on a criminal matter
Lawyer called me to offer services
In a social context
Other (please explain)
Please circle the numbers that best describe your behavior.
a.

b.

c.

d.

e.

I read the newspaper.
Never
1-3 times per week
Less than once per month
4-6 times per week
Less than once per week
Everyday
I watch television news.
Never
1-3 times per week
Less than once per month
4-6 times per week
Less than once per week
Everyday
I watch television shows about the police or legal system.
Never
1-3 times per week
Less than once per month
4-6 times per week
Less than once per week
Everyday
I read books about the police or legal system.
Never
5-6 times per year
1-2 times per year
1 time per month
3-4 times per year
2 or more times per month
I see movies about the police or legal system.
Never
5-6 times per year
1-2 times per year
1 time per month
3-4 times per year
2 or more times per month
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Appendix C
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF EL PASO, TEXAS
THREE HUNDRED THIRTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
VERDICT FORM

I find the defendant GUILTY of burglary (continue to bottom portion of form).

I find the defendant NOT GUILTY of burglary (stop here).

Continue ONLY if you checked GUILTY.
If you found the defendant GUILTY, for how many years would you sentence the defendant?
The sentencing guideline in the State of Texas for this offense of Second Degree Felony burglary
is no more than 20 years and no less than 2 years. In addition, the defendant, if charged, may be
punished by a fine not to exceed $10,000.

My sentence is:

Years and $

Fine (optional)
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Appendix D
Post Verdict Questionnaire
Without looking back at the trial transcript, please list from memory all relevant facts in evidence
on a separate line in the first column. You do not have to use all the lines.
Evidence

Rank Order

Pro-Prosecution or Defense

On the second column, please rank order each fact in order of importance to you in making your
personal verdict decision with 1 being the most important, 2, being next important, and so on.
On the last column, please indicate whether you personally feel that piece of evidence supports
the prosecution’s case (guilty) or the defense’s case (not guilty), regardless of your verdict
preference.
Considering all the evidence discussed in the trial, please indicate how strong you believe the
evidence to be against the defendant. When evaluating strength of evidence, think about how
guilty the evidence made the defendant look.
Very Strong Against
Defendant
1

Strong

Neutral

Weak

2

3

4
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Very Weak Against the
Defendant
5
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